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This a n a l y s i s of m a s u r e s t o be voted upon a t t h e 1974
g e n e r a l e l e c t i o l l h a s been prepared by t h e Colorado L e g i s l a t i v e Council a s a p u b l i c s e r v i c e t o members of t h e General
Assembly and t o t h e g e n e r a l p u b l i c p u r s u a n t t o 63-4-3, Colorado Revised S t a t u t e s 1963.
The p r o v i s i o n s of each proposal a r e s e t f o r t h , along
w i t h g e n e r a l c o ~ m e n t son t h e i r a p p l i c a t i o n and e f f e c t .
C a r e f u l a t t e n t i o n h a s been given t o arguments both f o r and
a g a i n s t t h e v a r i o u s p r o p o s a l s i n a n e f f o r t t o p r e s e n t both
s i d e s on each i s s u e .
While all arguments f o r and a g a i n s t
t h e propose2 amendments may n o t have been i n c l u d e d , major
ones have been s e t f o r t h , s o t h a t each c i t i z e n may d e c i d e
f o r himseif t h e r e l a t i v e m e r i t s of each p r o p o s a l .

I t should be emphasized t h a t t h e L e g i s l a t i v e Council
t a k e s no p o s i t i o n , pro o r con, w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e m e r i t s of
these proposals.
I n l i s t i n g t h e ARCUPTENTS FOR and t h e
ARGUKENTS AGAIKST, t h e c o u n c i l i s merely p u t t i n g f o r t h t h e
arguments most commonly o f f e r e d by proponents and opponents
of each p r o p o s a l .
The q u a n t i t y o r q u a l i t y of t h e FOR and
AGAINST paragraphs l i s t e d f o r each p r o p o s a l i s n o t t o be
i n t e r p r e t e d a s a n i n d i c a t i o n o r i n f e r e n c e of c o u n c i l s e n t i ment.
Respectfully submitted,

/s/

S e n a t o r Fred Anderson
Chairman

AMENDMENT NG. 1 -- INITIATED PROPOSAL

Ballot
Title:

An act to amend Articles XIV and X X of the Constitution
of the State of Colorado concerning the annexation of
property by a county or city and county, and prohibiting
the striking off of any territory from a county without
first submitting the question to a vote of the qualified
electors of the c o m t y and without an affirmative vote
of the majority of those electors.

Provisions of the P r o ~ o s e dConstitutional Amendment
The proposed amendment to the State Constitution would:

I,. Delete from the constitution the present requirement that
annexation proceedings of the City and County of Denver be conducted
under the general annexation laws applicable to all municipalities
in the state ("The Municipal Annexation Act of 1965").
2. Require that annexation proceedings of the City and County
of Denver be conducted under the general annexation and consolidation statutes applicable to the other 62 counties in the state.

3. Permit the General Assembly, by law, to revise procedures
for changing all county boundaries, including those of the City and
County of Denver, and thereby eliminate the constitutional requirement of a vote by the qualified electors of those counties fromwhich
territory is proposed to be stricken.
Comments
At the general election in 1902, Colorado voters approved Article X X of the State Constitution, which established Denver as both
a city and a county and which required that the boundaries of Denver's school district be coterminous with the bouridaries of the city
and county. Thus, under Artizle XX, a Denver annexation affects
county and school district bomdaries and affects the planning, utilization, and development of school and county facilities in the area
to be annexed.
Under the pro~osed amendment to Article XX, any annexation by
the City and County of Denver would have to be approved at a general
election in the county from which territory is to be annexed. This
requirement would apply until new procedures were adopted by the
General Assembly to provide alternate means for the annexation of
lands by the City and County of Denver, including annexation without
a vote of the electors of those counties involved.
Possible Implications of the Proposal. It is difficult to
predict or forecast the ultimate effect of the proposal if it is approved by the voters. The General Assembly has offered an alterna-

Denver Annexations to Follow County Procedures
tive constitutional amendment (Amendment No. 5) for consideration by
the voters. Both proposals amend Section 1 of Article XX. If both
amendments are approved by the voters, the language of each could be
added to the constitution.
This might mean that annexations by the
City-and County of Denver would have to comply with the general
annexation laws applicable to all counties, as well as receive the
approval of a proposed boundary control commission.
The ballot title for the amendment is incomplete.
It states,
in part, that the proposal prohibits "...THE STRIKING OFF OF ANY
TERRITORY FROM A COUNTY WITHOUT FIRST SUBMITTING THE QUESTION TO A
VOTE OF THE QUALIFIED ELECTORS OF THE COUNTY AND WITHOUT AN AFFIRMATIVE VOTE OF THE MAJORITY OF THOSE ELECTORS". In actcality, however, this language already appears in Section 3 of Article XIV of
the constitution, and the amendment places the following qualification on the language:
"EXCEPT AS OTHERWISE PROVIDED BY STATUTE".
Thus, the General Assembly would no longer be required to submit a
county annexation question to the voters, in spite of what is implied by the ballot title.
Popular Arpments For
1. The amendrr~entwould place suburban counties on a more equal
footing with the City and County of Denver in regard to annexation.
Any annexation by Denver would have to be approved by the voters in
the county or counties from which any territory is to be stricken, at
least until such time as new procedures are enacted into law by the
General Assembly. This is a reasonable requirenent that would allow
the electorate of affected counties to participate in the annexation
process.
2. The annexation policies of the City and County of Denver
have been a source of friction between the central city and its suburban neighbors. The effect of the axendment may be to forestall
further annexations and force metropolitan cooperation.

3. With the exception of Denver annexatians, municipal annexations in this state do not affect county or school district bourdaries. Annexations by the City and Colmty of Denver, on the other
hand, have an adverse effect on the abilfty of surrounding school
districts and counties to adequately plan for and provide needed
governmental services to residents of their communities. The existing constitutional and statutory framewcrk does not provide a basis
through which adequate consideration is given to the problems of
counties and school districts from whicb. land is stricken and added
to Denver. The amendment may force consideration of these issues.
4. Annexations disrupt land use planning in the Denver metropolitan area. Unreasonable pressures may be placed on communities to
reclassify lands when landowners are able to utilize annexaticn as a
lever to obtain local government authorization for development activity. Uncontrolled annexations are one factor contributing to urban
sprawl.
-2-
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5- The amendment iqould allow the General Assembly to estabP neceslish procedures for revision of collnty boundaries without thsity of a vote of the electorate of the county or counties fromwhich
territory is stricken. This provision would permit much nore flexibTlity in providing for logical colunty Sou>daries, particularly in
the mountainous areas of the state. Sone small comxunities, for
example, do not have direct highway access to their respective county seats because of rugged terrain.
Popular Arnuments Against
1. The amendment will eliminate the constitutional guarantee
that voters of a county from which territory is proposed to be
stricken be given an opportunity to vote on the issue and could result in a smaller number of counties.
2. The Denver metropolitan area is a single interdependent
economic entity.
Maintaining the vitality of the central city is
essential not only to the health of the metropolitan community but
to that of the entire state. Denver needs room to grow in order to
ensure a viable tax base in the future. The amendment, in effect,
would curtail further annexations by the city and county and cut
off its only opportunity for growth. No other municipality in the
state is handcuffed by such a restriction.

3. If supporters of the amendment were sincere about the
impact of Denver annexations on suburban school districts, the
amendment would have addressed this problem directly, rather than
attempting simply to isolate the central city. The amendment could
have separated the city annexation issue from the school district
annexation question.
4. The amendment, for purposes of annexation, equates the
City and County of Denver with counties rather than with municipalities. This is fallacious and misleading, since no county government
in the state is in the business of providing urban services such as
water, sewer, and fire protection. These services are provided
either by municipalities or by special service districts. Denver is
basically a city and, as such, provides essential urban services,
and the annexation question should be directed to this issue. The
so-called disruptions to the planning process and provision of governmental services in the suburban areas (supposedly caused by Denver's annexations) could be ninimized by a more positive attitude
on the part of suburban officials.

5. The freezing of Denver's boundaries (which is the goal of
the sponsors of this proposal) would place Denver in the same economic and social position as other central cities in the United States.
New industries, new communities, and the most productive tax bases
are developing outside the central cities. At the same time, the
aged, the handicapped, and the poor are locating in the central cities where low-cost transportation and other social services are
available. The inevitable result is a declining tax base and rising

Denver Annexations to Follow County Procedures
costs for central cities. Thus, any reduction in Denver's economic
vitality will result in an increase in need for state assistance to
Denver and in added burdens for all Colorado Taxpayers.

AMENDWENT NO. 2
Ballot
Title:

--

REFERRED BY GEXERAL ASSEKBLY

1

Shall the death penalty be imposed upon persons convicted of class 1 felonies where certain mitigating
circumstances are not present and certain aggravating circumstances are present:

Provisions of the Proposed Statute
The praposal would reinstate the death penalty in Colorado.
The dzath penalty, however, would or117 be imposed under the limited
circumstances outlined below.
Separate Sentencing Hearinzs. k person convicted of an offense for which the death periaity may he lmposed would be given s
zentencing hearing separate Iron the trial at xhich his gsi1t '-26
been deternined. The hearing would be before the tribl jury, or
before the judge if trial by jury had been waiced or if the deferidhnt had pleaded g7rilty.
At the sentencing hearing, information relevant to the existence cf any "aggravating" or "mitigating" factors could he presented
by the prosecztion or by the defense, subject to the m l e s governing
admission of evidence at c ~ i ~ i n atrials.
l
The jury, or the judge,
would annour;ce findings as to the existence of any mitigating c r aggravating clrcu~stances.
Mitlgatin~ Circu;nstances. Witigating circumstances are: (1)
the defendant xas under the age of 18 at the time of the crine: (2)
the capacity of the defcn3ant to distinguish right froc wrong was
significantly impaired; 131 the defendant was 1x.der "linusual and
substantial duress" at the tixe sf the crirce; ( 4 ) the defendant was
involved in th; capital cffense, which was com~ittedby another, but
his participation was relatively ninor; 07 ( 5 ) the defendant coxld
not reasonably have foreseen that the offense would cause, or create
a grave rlsk of causing, 2 death.
Aggravating Circumstances. Aggravating circumstances are: (1;
the defendant had previovsly been convicted of an offense for which
a sentence of life imprisonment or death was inpose? or could have
been imposed: (2) the offense was cotnsitted after previous convic-

Death Penalty
tion of the defendant for a class 1, 2, or 3 felony and at the time
he was serving a sentence imposed for the prior conviction; (3) the
defendant intentionally killed a person he knew to be a peace officer, fireman, or correctional officer; (4) the defendant intentionally killed a person kidnaped or held as hostage by him or by anyone associated with him; (5) the defendant was a party to an agreement to intentionally kill the victim; (6) the defendant committed
the offense while lying in ambush or by using a bomb or incendiary
device; ( 7 ) the defendant intentionally caused the death of the
victim while committinga class 1, 2, or 3 felony or during immediate
flight from such a felony; ( 8 ) while cowmitting the cffense, the
defendant knowingly created a grave risk of death to another person
in addition to the victim; or ( 9 ) the defendant conmitted the offense in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner.
Imposition of Penalty. If the jury, or the judge, determines
that one or more mitigating factors existed at the time of the offense, the court must impose a sen$ence of life imprisonment. If
it is determined that no mitigating factcrs existed and that one or
more aggravating factors did exist, the court must impose the death
penalty. If the determination of a jury as to the existence of
aggravating or mitigating circumstances is not unanimous, the court
nust sentence the defendant to life imprisonment.

On June 29, 1972, the United States Suprece Court, in a 5-to-

4 decision, overturned the imposition of the death penalty in three
cases, two in Geor ia an& one in Texas. (The decision is cited as
Furman p. Georgia.? While the decision ?id not rule the death penalty unconstitutional in itself, it dld determine thet the penalty
as applied in Georgia and Texas constituted a "crcei and m u s u a l
punishmect" in violation of thezighthand Fourteenth kmendaents to
the United States Ccnstitution.
The court's decisioc in Furaan v. Georgia is brief. The decision is followed by nine separate explanatcry opinions, one filed by
each Justice of the Supreme Court. Supporters of the death penalty
have turne? to these nine separate opinions for clarificatioc as to
hcw the death penalt,y might be constitutionally imposed.
Options. In resp~ndlngto the Supreme Court's decision in
Furman 1. G e o r ~ i a ,and to the explanatory opinions of the justices
of the Supreme Court in that case, states have generally selected
one of two ~ e t h o d sfor retaining the death penalty. The first.
method is to leave absolutely no discretion to juries in the inposition of the death penalty, but rather to mandate capital punishment for narrowly defined capital offenses. The second xethod provides a senteccing hearing separate from the trial at which gxiilt or
inrlocence is determined. The death peralty may be imposed at that
hearing depecding on the presence or absence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.

Death Penalty
The Colorado Criminal Code. Until effectively overturned by
the United States Supreme Court in its capital punishment decision,
the Colorado Criminal Code provided a maximum penalty of death and
a ninimum sentecce of life imprisonment for conviction of a class
1 felony.
Basically, the code gave discretionary power to the
courts to impose the death penalty. The following are class 1 felonies: (1) murder in the first degree; (2) kidnaping (although no
person may suffer the death penalty if the person ~ i d n aed was liberated alive prior to conviction of the kidnaper); (37 aggravated
assault by an inmate attempting to escape from a correctional institution provided the inmate had been convicted of a class 1 felony;
and (4j treason.
The proposed law does not make any changes in the list of
crimes subject to the death penalty under the Colorado Criminal Code.
The proposal does establish procedures and conditions to be followed
by juries and judges in imposing the death penalty.
If the proposal is adopted and subsequently declared unconstitutional, any person sentenced to death under the provisions of the
proposal would be resentenced to life imprisonment.
Popular Arguments For

1. The State of Colorado may lawfully establish punishments
for purposes of retribution and deterrence.
Punishments should be
graduated to fit offenses, with the most serious crime calling for
the maximum penalty. The drafters of the United States Constitution
determined that this maximum penalty should be the death penalty.
They did not consider the death penalty to be cruel and unusual punishment. (The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution '
contains two specific references to the death penalty. This amendment to the constitution was adopted on the same day in 1791 onwhich
the Eighth Amendment, prohibiting cruel and unusu.al punishments, was
adopted. )
2. The proposed death penalty law meets the standards of the
Supreme Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia. The law would not
provide unqualified discretion to judges and juries in imposing the
death penalty. The death penalty could not be arbitrarily imposed
under the law. It could only be imposed after the determination of
whether aggravating or mitigating circuastances exist, and this determination must be made according to specific standards.

3. The proposal would require the death penalty to be imposed
only for the most serious or heinous crimes.
4. The death penalty acts as a deterrent against capital
crimes. In particular, law enforcement officials and prison guards
are vulnerable to murder by criminals or prison inmates. A criminal
being pursued by a law enforcement official would be more hesitant
to attempt to kill his pursuer if he knew that he might receive the
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death penalty as a result. The death penalty may be the only deterrent against capital crimes by felons already serving sentences of
life imprisonment.

5. There are no clear indications that capital punishment is
offensive to the moral standards of society in the United States
today. On the contrary, prior to the United States Supreme Court
decision in Furman v. Georgia, 40 states employed statutory death
penalties. Colorado voters approved retention of the death penalty
in 1966 by a vote of more than two to one. On four occasi'ons since
1961, Congress has added to the list of federal crimes punishable
by death.
6. Because of the parole process, a number of persons sentenced to life imprisonment are eventually released from prison and
returned to society. The imposition of the death penalty in a case
of capital crime is the only way in which society can be assured
that a second capital offense will not be committed by the same
criminal.
Popular Arguments Against
1. In spite of the fact that capital punishment laws are
intended to operate equitably, national studies of the imposition
of the death penalty reveal tk-~.: judges and juries have discriminated, at least in a statistical sense, by sex, race, and economics. A homicide analysis reveals that men kill between four and
five times more frequently than do women, but the execution rate
for men is more than 100 times as great as it is for women. No
woman has ever been executed in Colorado. National statistics also
reveal that the rate of execution among blacks is higher than would
be expected from examination of relative crime rates. Furthermore,
the defendant with money is able to have his case presented in
court by experts, and he is more likely to escape capital punishment than a poor defendant. Thus, the death penalty is historically incompatible with the Fourteenth Amendment constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws.
2. Two issues of paramount importance raised in :he opinions
of the Supreme Court Justices in Furman v. Georgia are that:

ia)

the death penalty has been inflicted arbitrarily; and

(b) only a small number of criminals have been executed.
Both factors are considered importan' in determining whether capital punishment is a cruel and unusual punishment and prohibited by
the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Regardless of the intent of the proposal to eliminate arbitrary sentencing practices, discretion must continue to be exercised
by both judges and juries in the determination of aggravating and
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mitigating circumstances. Furthermore, the limitations contained
in the proposal on imposing capital punisk~entwill inevitably result in even fewer judges and juries imposing the death sentence.
Both of these situations raise serious constitutional questions of
equal protection of the laws.

3. Statistical studies demonstrate that there is no correlation between the murder rate and the presence or absence of
capital punishment. The penalty is now so infrequ.ently imposed
that the threat of execution is too attenuated to be of substantial service to criminal justice.

4. In terms of dollars and cents, capital punishment laws
do not represent a savings to the taxpayer.
Because of long and
bitterly contested trials, post-trial legal maneuvering, and other
administration-of-justice costs in these cases, the expense
involved is often higher than in those cases in which the death
penalty is not a consideration.

5. Factcrs whlch should determine whether a sentence of
death is an appropriate penalty in a given case are likely tc be
precluded fro12 consideratior, by the proposed law.
The list cf
~itigatingand aggravating circumstances is not adequate to cover
ti-,!? icfinite variety of circumstances which may arise in a given
crime. The circumstances of any given crime may be too complex to
bo compressed into a simple formula.
6. There is no reason to believe that capital punishment
any- penal purpose more effectively than imprisonment.
:he
death penalty is a uniquely and i~morallysevere punishment
:;tilized as a primitive tool to gain revenge.
::?.T.V~~

AKXFDMENT NO. 3
Ballot
Title:

--

REFEiRRED RY GENERAI, ASSEMBLY

h amendment tc Section 12 of Article X of the Constitution of the State of Colorado relating to state
moneys and reports of the State Treasurer and deleting
the requirement for listing and publishing the nurrLber
and amount of each warrant paid by the State Treasurer.

Provisi.ons of
-

the Proposed Constit~tionalAmendnent

The proposed amendment would revise an 1876 provision of the
St;ate Constitution relating to public funds in the hands of the
State Treasurer and the quarterly reports which he is required to
publish. The proposal would delete from the constitution the requirement that there be listed in the quarterly report of the State Treasurer "the number and amount of every warrant received, and the number and amount of every warrant paid therefrom during the quarter".

Publication of State Warrants
Comments
During the last fiscal year, nearly two million warrants were
paid by the treasurer, almost half of which represented refunds of
the sales tax on food. If all the warrants paid were listed by number and amount, the quarterly report of the State Treasurer would
consist of endless pages of figures. Publication of the warrant numbers and amounts in a newspaper would entail at least one hundred
pages consisting solely of figures. A detailed quarterly report of
warrant amounts and numbers was last prepared in 1958, and the report
required 84 pages of print.
Popular Arguments For

1. The costs of preparing quarterly reports listing hundreds
of thousands of warrants by number and amount, and the cost of publishing such lists in a newspaper, is substantial and should not be
required.
2. A daily list of all warrants draw, by the State Controller
is available in the State Treasurer's office, and the statutes provide that "...such lists shall be open during regular businesshours
for the inspection and examination of every person desiring to inspect or examine the same". Any interested person may now examine
the daily lists of all warrants issued and paid.
Popular Arguments A~ainst
1. The amendment could affect the people's "right to knowu.
Although there may be no obvious reason at present for the detailed
publication of information relating to state warrants, such published information may be needed at some tine in the future. One
of the safeguards of responsible governcent is convenient access to
public information.
AMENDMENT NO. 4 -- REFERRED BY GENERAL ASSEPBLY
Ballot
Title:

An amendment to Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution of the State of Colorado, concerning the
supplying of energy and providing that cities an2
towns may become subscribers or shareholders in any
corporations or companies and joint owners with any
persons, corporations, or companies in order to
effect the development of energy resources after
discovery, or production, transportation, or transmission of energy.

Joint Develo~mentof Energy Resources
Provisions of the Proposed Constitutional Amendment
The proposal would amend the State Constitution to allow a
city or town to participate, as a joint owner or shareholder, with
private or public entities in the development, production, and
transrr~issio~
of energy resources. The proposal would prohibit municipal participation in the exploratory stage of energy resource development.
Comments
In a number of Colorado conmunities, current and expected
shortages of electricity and natural gas have caused municipal and
utility company authorities to express concern over provisions ofthe
State Constitution which, in effect, restrict alternative methods of
financing the development, production, and transmission of energy.
Energyis presently supplied to consumers by investor-owned companies,
federal projects, and municipalities. However, municipal leaders and
utility companies assert that, without joint projects between utility
companies and government, necessary facility size and development
capital cannot bc obtained.
The constitution currently authorizes Colorado communities to
cooperate or contract with other local governments, with the federal
governjnent, or with private persons, associations, and corporations
to provide basic governmental services. Cities and towns may not,
however, become subscribers or shareholders in, or joint owners with,
any corporation or company (unless ownership accrues to the community
by donation, forfeiture, or purchase).
The proposal would alter this prohibition by permitting a city
or town, for energy resource development only, to become a subscriber
or shareholder in any public or private corporation or company, or a
joint owner with any public or private person, company, or corporation. The constitution would continue to prohibit the participation
of county governments and state government in such joint projects.
Funding of Projects. Financing of a municipality's share of
a joint project would come from traditional revenue sources, such
as funds derived from utility fees and charges, and from the sale
of revenue bonds. Although the proposal does not specifically
prevent the sale of general obligati~nbonds, the issuance of these
bonds is subject to other constitutional and local charter provisions which usually require elections and limit total debt.
Joint ownership agreements could provide that each participant supply funds for its share of a power project, with each using
its own method of financing. Participants' tax liabilities would
also be separate. The proposal would not alter the present constitutional prohibition against cities and towns lending or pledging
credit to any public or private person, company, or corporation,or
becoming responsible for any debt or liability of such an entity.

Joint Development of Energy Resources
Popular Arguments For
1. The energy crisis is so acute a problem that the knowledge
and capital resources of government and industry must be combined
to meet increasing demands for power. Over 30 municipalities in
Colorado currently operate their own utility systems to provide
electricity to their communities. However, several of these cities
and towns are depending on the adoption of this proposal to meet
the kind of immediate or long-range energy needs which each community, acting independently, cannot meet.
2. Contemporary developments are making joint action between
private and municipal utilities necessary. Environmen'al
laws and
pressures are restricting the options for obtaining electrical
energy supplies, creating a need for a smaller total n m b e r of generating plants which are much larger in capacity than most existing
plants.

3 . The proposal would permit a municipality to pay for its
own share of a joint production rather than incur the greater expense of a separate facility. It is less costly for a city to have
a 50 megawatt share of a jointly-owned 500 megawatt plant than to
be the sole owner of a 50 megawatt facility. Without a joint
development effort between business and government, necessary economies of scale in energy development cannot be attained. As a
result, a lower price to the energy consumer will not be realized.
Popular Arguments Against

1. Private industry now provides for much of the development,
production and transmission of energy resources in Colorado. The
prcposal would substantially broaden the kind of ownership interest
a community may hold.
This grant of authority is an extension of
A city could buy majority stock in
governmental responsibility.
a private utility, oil company, coal company or other energy company
2. The proposal does not provide for enactment of additional
state guidelines for municipal participation with private or public
entities in the development of energy resources.

3. Municipalities should be authorized only to join in business ventures with zlearly established utility businesses. Instead,
the proposal provides a much broader authorization for joint ventures between a city or town and any person, any corporation, or
any company.

AMENDMENT NO.
Ballot
Title:

5 -- REFERRED BY GENERAL ASSEMBLY

An amendment to Article XX of the Constitution of
the State of Colorado, concerning the modernization
of annexation and consolidation proceedings in the
Denver metropolitan area, and creating a boundary
control commission with powers related thereto.

Provisions of the Proaosed Constitutional Amendment
The proposed amendment to the State Constitution would:

1. Create a six-member boundary control commission composed
of three county commissioners, one each from Adams, Arapahoe, and
Jefferson Counties, and three elected officials of the City and
County of Denver. The boundary control commissioners from Adams,
Arapahoe, and Jefferson Counties would be appointed by the respective boards of county commissioners, and the boundary control cornmissioners from Denver would be appcinted by the mayor.
2. Require that any future annexations by the City and County of Denver be approved by a majority of the six-member boundary
control c~mmissionprior to initiation of presently required proceedings under the "Municipal Annexation Act of 1965".
3. Permit the commission to de-annex any territory validly
annexed to the City and County of Denver during the period f r m
March 1 , 1973, to the effective date of the amendment.

4. As of July 1, 1975, automatically detach any land annexed
to the City and County of Denver, the City of Lakewood, or the City
of Aurora between April 1, 1974, and the date of certification of
approval by the voters of the proposal, unless such annexation is
ratified by the commission.

5. Prohibit the City and County of Denver from annexing any
territory in counties other than Arapahoe, Jefferson, and Adams
without a unanimous vote of approval by the board of county commissioners of the county from which the land is to be annexed. Denver,
of course, could only annex lands contiguous to itself, and such
annexations would have to be approved by the proposed boundary control commission, as noted above.

The General Assembly is offering this amendment as an alternative to Amendment No. 1, an initiated proposal. Both proposals are
designed to provide recourse for suburban counties opposing annexations by the City and County of Denver. If both amendments were
:~dopted,the provisions of Amendment No. 1 would require that Denver
annexations comply with the general annexation laws applicable to
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counties rather than to cities, while Amendment No. 5 would impose
an additional condition that annexations by the City and County of
Denver be approved by a boundary control commission.
Kany of the general arguments concerning annexation policies
in the Denver metropolitan area presented in the analysis of Amendment No. 1 are applicable to this proposal. These arguments have
not been repeated here.
Popular Arguments For
1. The annexation issue is only one symptcm of the overall
problems of the Denver metropolitan area. Some of the basic issues
facing metropolitan Denver are housing, particularly the opportunity for all economic levels to obtain housing throughout the metropolitan community; equal educational opportcnities; an equitable
distribution of the costs of government, such as services provided
by the central city which are of benefit to the entire metropolitan
community; and a fair distribution of resources such as water.
Amendment No. 5 has been offered as part of a total legislative
package to deal directly with these issues and to alleviate Denversuburban discord.
2. The proposed boundary control co~missionwould serve as a
forum for identification of all the issues involved in annexations
by the City and County of Denver. The commission would provide an
opportunity to balance the question of viability of suburban governments with the problems and needs of the central city. Thus, the
amendment would encourage mderstanding between Denver and the suburbs. The Denver-suburban relationship has been strained in the
past, at least in part because of Denver's unilateral annexing
powers, which exist under present constitutional and statutory Frovisions. Resolution of the annexation question in a more cooperative atmosphere would enhance the possibility for metropolitan cooperation in solving other problems.

3. The boundary control commission would be a positive step
in the development of a more effective growth plan for the metropolitan community. The commission may be able to reduce the pressures that private developers exert on local governments in the
metropolitan area, particularly by playing one local government
against another. In other words, if a private land developer has
the option of annexing a potential development to Denver, he may
be able to force Denver and a suburban jurisdiction to compete for
that developmect, pressing unwarranted 6emands for rezoning and
other governmental services.
4. The nembership of the commission as proposed in the amendment (three mecbers from Denver and three members from the suburban
counties) is equitable. The General Assefibly, in considering amendments to the referred measure, rejected the idea of a seven-member
commission. A seventh member on the commission wou-ld have unreason-
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able power in breaking tie votes between Denver and the suburbs.

An even balance is essential if an effective program of metropolitan
cooperation is to be achieved, and the commission should not be able
to act on an annexation unless there is general support of the action by both Denver and suburban commissioners.
Popular Arguments Against

1. A six-member commission with membership equally divided
between Denver and the suburban counties may result in frequent
three-to-three votes. This potectial for stalemate leaves little
chance for serious consideration of Denver's annexation proposals.
Furthermore, the composition of the commission should not be "frozen" into the State Constitution, as provided by the amendment.
Approval of the anendment by the voters would seriously handicap
the General A s s e ~ b l yin the development of meaningful laws to resolve the Denver annexation issue.
2. Although the commission would have to ratify any annexation by the City of Lakewood or the City of Aurora for the period
from April 1, 1974, to the effective date of the amendment, it
would not have any authority to consider annexations by these two
cities or other suburban municipalities initiated after implementation of the amendment. Further, the commission is not entrusted
with the review of special district formation and extension of services. Thus, the commission would not be effective in dealing with
the problems of competing tax jurisdictions, urban sprawl, and
overlapping local governments which now confront the Denver metropoli tan area.

3. Opponents of the proposal believe that the evenly balanced
six-member commission may encourage a "tradeoff" between the central city and one of the suburban counties, to the detriment of the
two other suburban counties. If one suburban member of the proposed
commission votes with the central city, Denver could continue with
an annexation program in the other two counties,seriously jeopardizing the viability of local school districts and county government
in the county or counties involved i n the annexations. Such an occurrence, of course, would lead to further erosion of metropolitan
cooperation.

4. The most critical impact of Denver's annexations involves
changes in suburban school district boundaries. The amendment affects this issue directly, but does not ensure that educational
considerations will play a part in the deliberations of the boundary control commission. The amendment should address the issue of
school district boundary changes with regard to educational considerations and should not simply attempt to forestall logical
growth patterns for Denver's municipal government.

AkENDPiENT NO. 6

--

REFERRED BY GENERAL ASSEMBLY
I

Ballot
Title:

An amendment to Articles IV, V, and XI1 of the Constitution of the State of Colorado concerning the revision
of functions and procedures of the executive and legislative departments of the State of Colorado, providing
for filling vacancies in state offices, and relieving
the Lieutenant Governor of legislative duties.

Provisions of the Proposed Constitutional Amendment
The proposed constitutional amendment would provide that:

1. The Lieutenant Governor would become Governor in the
event of a permanent vacancy in the office of the Governor (this
provision, in itself, is not a change from the present procedure).
2. If a permanent vacancy should occur in the office of
Lieutenant Governor, the Governor would nominate a candidate to
fill the office, subject to confirmation by majority votes in both
houses of the General Assercbly.

3. Simultaneous per~anentvacancies in the offices of Governor and Lieutenant Governor would be filled by a line of succession
among certain legislative leaders, provided that the individual
filling a vacancy is a member of the same political party as the
Governor and Lieutenant Governor. The line of succession for such
simultaneous vacancies would be in the following order: first,
President of the Senate; second, Speaker of the House; third, Winority Leader of the Senate; and fourth, Minority Leader of the House.
4. A temporary vacancy in the office of the Governor would
be filled by the Lieutenant Governor.

5. A temporary vacancy in the office of the Lieutenant Governor or a simultaneous temporary vacancy in the offices of Governor and Lieutenant Governor would be filled according to the legislative line of succession detailed above.
6. Nental or physical disability of the Governor or Lieutenant Governor, and the resultant vacancy of either office, would be
determined in either of the following ways:
(a) a voluntary written declaration of disability by the Governor or Lieutenant Governor; or
(b) a determination of disability by the Colorado Supreme
Court, which determination could be made only at the request of two-thirds of the members of each house of the
General Assembly.
The Supreme Court could, on its own initiative, determine that a
state of disability of the Governor or Lieutenant Governor has
ceased.

Gubernatorial Succession and Executive and Legislative Procedures

7. For a Governor-elect or for a Lieutenant Governor-elect,
succession procedures and procedures for determination of disability would be the same as if the oath of office had been taken.
8. The Senate would elect one of its own members as presiding officer, who would be called the President of the Senate. The
Lieutenant Governor would no longer serve in this capacity. The
office of President pro tempore of the Senate would be abolished.
The only present function of the latter is to serve as Lieutenant
Governor in the event of a vacancy in that office.
9. Gubernatorial appointments to fill vacancies in the
offices of State Treasurer, Secretary of State, or Attorney General
would be subject to Senate confirmation.
10. Kembers of the General Assembly would be able to enact
legislation to establish or change their legislative expense allowances at any time. Furthermore, they would receive the same mileage rate for official travel to which state employees are entitled.
The present constitution prevents members of the General Assembly
from receiving mileage rate increases during their terms of office.

11. In addition to the regular session that occurs eachyear,
the General Assembly would be permitted to call itself into special session upon the written request of two-thirds of the members of
each house. Only those subjects specified in the request could be
considered during the special session. At present, only the Governor can call the General Assembly into special session, and the
business of the special session is limited to that named in the
Governor's proclamation.
12. A member of the General Assembly would be permitted to
accept appointment to another civil office "under this state",
provided that he resign from his legislative seat.
Present language of the constitution prohibits a state legislator from accepting appointment to such an office during the term for which he has
been elected.
13. A maximum deviation of five percent from the mean legislative district population, or an actual maximum deviation of 10
percent, would be allowed between the populations of the most and
the least populous legislative districts. (In this provision, and
in certain other respects, the proposal is in direct conflict with
Amendment No. 9, an initiated proposal.
This conflict is more
fully discussed in the analysis of Amendment No. 9 elsewhere in
this publication.)
14. The existing provision that the State Auditor may serve
no more than two consecutive five-year terms would be removed frorc
the constitution.
The proposal would also eliminate the constitutional prohibition against the State Auditor holding public office
during the two years subsequent to his service as State Auditor.
The proposal wou-ld allow the General Assembly, by law, to permit
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the State Auditor to serve on a board or
other public office during his term.

commission or to hold

15. The General Assembly would be permitted to enact legislation to allow old, uncollectable debts to be written off.
This
practice is presently prohibited.
16. The State Treasurer would be allowed to adopt new procedures, such as issuing checks, for disbursement of state funds.
At present, state funds may be paid out only on warrants drawn on
the State Treasury.
In addition to the provisions discussed above, a number of
minor "housekeeping" or nonsubstantive amendments are proposed to
revise the order and language of the constitution pertaining to
practices, processes, and operations of the legislative and executive branches of state government.
Comments
The proposal would make several changes in the constitution in
order to resolve questions that have arisen in the past concerning
the filling of permanent or temporary vacancies in the offices of
Governor and Lieutenant Governor.
The major goals of these proposed changes are to provide greater permanence in the process of
succession and to increase executive control over succession procedures. The proposal would also establish a mechanism through which
the General Assembly could request the Supreme Court to determine
whether a Governor or Lieutenant Governor is unable to carry out the
duties of his office.
Disbursement of State Funds. The proposal would permit the
State Treasurer to disburse state funds in some other manner than
by warrant drawn on the treasury. On occasion, the treasurer receives federal funds for distribution to local governments. The constitutional requirement for issuance of warrants in such an instance
is cumbersome and time-consuming. Disbursements, such as flowthrough money to local governqents, could be expedited through the
adoption of either a simplified checking system or a simplified warrant system.
Uncollectable Accounts. It has been reported by the state
Legislative Audit Committee that uncollectable debts, totaling over
one million dollars, have been carried by the state as accounts
receivable for many years. This must be done because Section 38 of
Article V of the constitution prohibits "writing off" such uncollectable accounts. An amendment to this section is proposed which
would allow the General Assembly to establish a statutory policy
for release of uncollectable accounts in order to reduce costs
associated with recording such bad debts.

Gubernatorial Succession and Executive and Leaislative Procedures
Popular Arguments For
1. The present method of gubernatorial succession is inadequate, particularly when viewed in terms of continuity of programs
of a Governor and Lieutenant Governor who are elected as a team.
The proposal would enable the Governor to appoint a successor Lieutenant Governor in the event of a vacancy in that cffice, and the
amendment emphasizes that others in line of succession must be of
the same political party, reflecting voter preference for a party
at the last election.
2. Government in the United States is based upon a doctrine
of separation of powers. A strong, independent legislative branch
is an essential part of this doctrine. Two steps are taken by the
amendment to strengthen the independence of the General Assembly
from the executive branch of state government. First, the Senate
would elect its own presiding officer. Second, the General Assembly would be permitted to call itself into special session.

3. Present restrictions placed on the State Auditor precluding his election to state office for two years following his service as auditor and prohibiting him from serving in any other
capacity of state government during that service are unwarranted.
The auditor, in particular, has a unique opportunity to develop
familiarity with many areas of state government, and his knowledge
and expertise should not be wasted. The constitutional limitation
on tenure also reduces flexibility in hiring the most qualified
applicant for State Auditor.
Pooular Arguments Aaainst
1. Detailed provisions of gubernatorial succession and provisions for determining gubernatorial disability belong in the state
statutes rather than in the constitution. The amendment should have
been written to permit the General Assembly to establish the line of
succession by law.

2. The liaison that the executive branch now has with the General Assembly would be greatly diminished if the Lieutenant Governor
were to be removed from his position as President of the Senate.
Furthermore, the Lieutenant Governor's only remaining constitutional
obligation under the proposal would be to succeed the Governor. The
proposal should have either abolished the office of Lieutenant Governor or assigned additional duties to that office.

3 . Prohibiting members of the General Assembly fro^ accepting appointments to civil office (during the terms for which they
have been elected) is essential to maintaining the integrity of a
part-time citizen legislature. Appointment to public office during
a legislative term could create a situation of conflict of interest. Similarly, restrictions presently imposed on the State Auditor,
providing a maximum of two five-year terms and prohibiting appoint-
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ment to another public office for two years following a term in office should be retained.

AMENDMENT NO. 7

--

REFERRED BY GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Ballot An amendment to Article X of the Constitution of the
Title: State of Colorado, removing the proceeds of the motor
fuel tax on aviation fuel from the Highway Users Tax
Fund.

Provisions of the Pro~osedConstitutional Amendment
The proposal would eliminate the present constitutionalrequirement that revenue from excise taxes on aviation fuel be used only
for public highway purposes. Instead, any revenue from excisetaxes
on aviation fuel (if levied at some time in the future) could only
be used for aviation purposes. The proposed amendment would apply
to fuels used in both commercial and geceral aviation.
Comments
Since 1935, the State Constitution has required that all revenue from excise taxes on gasoline or other liqv.id motor fuel be used
only for public highway purposes.
This constitutional requirement
applies to all excise taxes on aviation fuel. Colorado does not,
however, impose any kind of aviation fuel tax at the present time.
Consequently, the proposed elimination of the requirement that aviation fuel tax revenue be used for highway purposes would not have a
financial impact on Colorado highway revenue.
Historically,.public airport facilities in Colorado have been
financed from a variety of revenue sources, including landing fees,
rentals, various agreed-upon charges levied primarily on scheduled
airlines, and so-called "fuel flowage fees", "gallonage fees", or
"royalties". These aviation fuel fees have been levied by local
governments on general aviation (non-commercial, privately-owned
aircraft).
Po~ularA r ~ ~ e n tFor
s
1. Colorado's Highway Users1 Tax Fund system is based on a
user-benefit tax theory.
Under this system, the highway motorist
provides the basic financial support for the state and local highway
systems.
In regard to aviation fuel, however, the present Highway
Users1 Tax Fund system violates this user-benefit theory. The present language of the constitution prevents revenue from aviation

Aviation Fuel

--

Allocation of any Future Tax

fuel excise taxes from being use2 to benefit aviation interests.
The proposed constitutional amendment would remove this inequity
from the state's Highway Users' Tax Fund system.
2. "Fuel flowage fees", "gallonage fees", and "royalties" on
.aviation fuel are being collected and used by local governments to
develop public airport facilities in Colorado.
The present language of the constitution provides that excise taxes on liquid
motor fuel must be used for highway purposes.
Thus, it could be
argued that the proceeds from local charges on aviation fuel must
be allocated for highways rather than for airports.
The proposed
amendment would clarify that the revenue from fuel taxes now levied
on general aviation by local governments be utilized for aviation
purposes.

3. The proposal does not in itself impose an excise tax on
aviation fuel, nor does it divert funds from the state Highway
Users' Tax
for aviation purposes.
(Revenue presently collected from local charges on aviation fuel is not part of the Highway
Users' Tax m d . 1
Popular Arguments Against

1. The state's transportation tax program should be flexible
and should not be restricted by unnecessary constitutional limitations. The present practice of constitutionally "earmarking" certain
sources of tax revenue for specific governmental purposes (highway
construction for example) is a serious limitation on the ability of
the General Assembly to develop a flexible transportation tax program. The proposed amendment to the ccnstitution would place an
equally serious restriction on the ability of the General Assembly to
fund total transportation needs of the community.
2. The existence or construction of airports creates demands
for new, improved, or redesigned roads and highways. The csers of
airports should pay for these airport-related roads and highways.
Therefore, any revenue from excise taxes on aviation fuel should be
available for use for highway as well as aviation purposes.

3. The proposal is likely to lead to the imposition of a new
type cf state tax, an excise tax on aviation fuel. A state tax
would result in higher costs to the consumer of aviation services,
and particularly to the user of scheduled air transportation. In
addition this type of tax would be unfair to the owners and users
of the 98 privately-operated airports in the state, since fuel taxes
paid at those private airports would be used to benefit publiclyowned airports. In the same sense, it would be unfair to place an
excise tax on aviation fuel used by scheduled air carriers in order
to generate revenue for airports and aviation facilities not required by the carriers.

AMENDMENT NO. 8
Ballot
Title:

--

INITIATED PROPOSAL

An amendment to Section 8 of Article IX of the Constitution of the State of Colorado, to prohibit the
assignment or the transportation of pupils to public educational institutions in order to achieve
racial balance of pupils at such institutions.

Provisions of the Pro~osedConstitutional Amendment
The proposed amendment to the State Constitution would prohibit the assigmxent or transportation of children to any public
school for purposes of achieving racial balance.
The amendment
wo-uld apply to public but not to privately-operated schools.
Comments
The "Brownt1Decisions. It is important to recall the landmark
United States Supreme Court decisions of 1954 and 1955 in Brown V.
Board of Education.
In the first of these decisions, the court
-struck down the legal doctrine of "separate but equal" school systems
(dual systems) by stating that separate educational facilities for
school children of different races were "inherently unequal".
In the second Brown decision, it was held that all provisions
of federal, state, or local law requiring or permitting racial discrimination through separate educational facilities must yield in
providing remediation of the inherent inequality of the segregated
situation.
In a subsequent case, the court articulated the final
purpose of the second Brown decision: "the transition to a unitary,
nonracial system of public education was and is the ultimate end to
be brought about..."
(Green v. County School Board).
The Denver Dese~regationCase. Court action in the Denver
desegregation controversy was initiated in June of 1969. The Denver
federal district court issued a preliminary injunction in the case
in July of that year, and a decision was entered by the court in 1970.
This 1970 decision found that, for nearly a decade, racial segregation of the Park Hill schools in Denver had been achieved through
manipulation of school attendance zones and through use of mobile
classroom units, new school construction, teacher assignments, and
other means. The court also concluded that segregated "core city"
schools were educationally inferior to predominately Anglo schools.
The court then adopted plans to remedy these situations.
The 1970 federal district court decision was appealed to the
Tenth Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. The court of appeals affirmed
the Park Hill segregation ruling, but reversed the decision with regard to so-called "core city" schools.
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Review of the Controversy by the Supreme Court.
The Denver
desegregation case was eventually reviewed by the United States
Supreme Court, which modified the decision of the court of appeals.
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Denver federal district
court, slating, in effect, that unless the school segregation which
had been proven to exist in the Park Hill area had occurred isolated
and remote from the rest of the Denver school system, such segregation indicated that the entire school district was unconstitutionally
segregated. If so, the Denver Board of Education would have to be
directed by the federal district court to desegregate the entire system "root and branch".

Subsequent Findings of the Federal District Court. In December
of 1973, pursuant to the directive of the Supreme Court, the Decver
federal district court made a determination that the situation of intentional segregation in the Fark Hill schools was not isolated or
remote from the rest of the school system. Thus, the entire system
was declared by the court to be an unconstitutionally dual schoolsystem, and, in April of 1974, the court mandated a plan of desegregation
for the entire district.
Provisions of the Dese~reeationPlan. The desegregation plan
mandated by the federal district court is estimated to affect pupil
transportation and assignment in the Denver school system for the
1974-1975 school year as outlined below. (It should be noted that
the four aspects of the plan outlined below do not comprise its entirety; the are, however, the major components of the plan as of
July, 1974.

y

(a)

Busing. It is estimated that between 24,500 and 27,500
children (out of a total enrollment of 80,000)are to be
bused under the plan. During the 1973-1974 school year,
approximately 15,000 children were bused.

(b) Attendance Areas. In the implementation of the desegregation plan, the attendance areas of all but four of the
schools in the Denver school district have been altered.
Some of these attendance area changes have been minor,
while some represent substantial departures from past
boundaries.
(c) Pairing. A classroom "pairing" system involving 37 elementary schools has been designed. According to this
plan, a pupil will, on alternate days, attend a "paired"
school for at least half of his class time and will
attend his neighborhood school for tha remainder of the
day.
(d)

Satellite Attendance Areas. The "satellite" school concept involves the assignment of students from schools
with concentrated minority or Anglo enrollments for purposes of integrating other schoois. Twenty-six elementary schools, 13 juxior high schools, and six high schools
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will be integrated by receiving students from "satellite"
attendance areas.
Conflict Between the Froposal and the Denver Dese~re~ation
The provisions of the proposed amendment to the State Constiare in apparent conflict with the desegregation plan ordered
into effect for the Denver schools in April of 1974.
The proposed
amendment would prohibit both the transportation and the assignment
of pupils to achieve racial balance. Pupil assignment and transportation according to race, however, have been determined by the court
to be essential to the implementation of the desegregation plan.

Plan.
tution

Popular Ar~umentsFor
1. Adoption of the proposed amendment would reinforce the existing language of the Colorado Constitution which prohibits "any
distinction or classification of pupils
on account of race or
colort'. Its adoption would reaffirm that Colorado voters do not
want public policy decisions made on the basis of racial distinctions.

...

2. The proposed amendment represents a referendm on thequestion of the busing and assignment of school children for purposes of
achieving racial balance or integration. The adoption of the amendment would be a mandate against racially-determined busing and pupil
assignment which could not be ignored by state and national political leaders. (The Colorado General Assembly has already gone on
record as favoring Congressional action against the assignment of
school children on the basis of race; in 1974, the General Assembly
adopted a resolution urging Congress to propose an amendment to the
federal constitution which would prohibit such racially-determined
school assignments and which would give Congress the power toenforce
the prohibition through legislation.)

3. The proposal is intended to be a clear indication to the
judicial branch of government and to local school authorities that
racial distinctions are not to be made in decisions relating topupil
assignments and transportation. It is desirable to place these instructions in the State Constitution, since constitutional "ground
rules" for pupil assignment and transportation will make it more
difficult for courts to make policy decisions for local school authorities relating to these aspects of education. Within the constitutional "ground rules", local school authorities would be free, as
they have been in the past, to set policy for pupil assignment and
transportation in the communities with which they are familiar and
to which they are responsible.

4. The proposed amendment will be instrumental in bringing an
end to busing for purposes of racial integration. If it is not curtailed, racially-oriented busing will increase pupil transportation
costs in the Denver school system to an unacceptable level. The
funds required for busing could be better utilized for educational
programs, particularly in core city schools.
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5. If pupil transportation is used as a tool in achieving
racial integration, the practical problems inherent in the busing of
school children will be intensified. These problems include delayed
arrival at school in bad weather, inflexibility in school scheduling,
discipline and safety problems on buses, and traffic safety problems
at -bus stops and near the schools.

6. Busing of a child away from his home area is contrary to
the concept of the "neighborhood school", a concept which is desirable for several reasons. Neighborhood schools permit children to
walk to school, to be close to home in case of emergencies, and to
return home quickly after school. Neighborhood schools permit participation in extracurricular activities without transportation difficulties or special administrative arrangements. Parental involvement in schocl activities is enhanced by the neighborhood schocl.
The neighborhood school is particularly important in the early
grades. The neighborhood school pernits a child to develop and niaintain a sense of identity with his local community.

7. F'ublic schools are established for the purpose of educating
children without regard to racial, ethnic, or religious considerations. Schools should not be used for solving pervasive societal
problems such as racial segregation; these problems go far beyond the
realm of education. Further, it is unlikely that the court-ordered
desegregation plan will be of any nse in actually increasing the educational opportunities of minority children in the Denver school
system. The strong public support that schools have enjoyed in the
past, particularly in regard to school finance, will decrease if the
schools are forced into the role of agents of sccial change.
Popular Arguments Against

1. The proposal may be without ultimate substance or effect ir
law. On the basis of the requirement for "equal protection of the
laws' contained in the federal constitution, the United States Supren
Court and lower federal courts have assumed jurisdiction in and have
ruled In the Denver desegregation controversy. The proposed amendment to the state constitution is in apparent conflict witl= these
federal rulings. If adopted by the voters, the proposed amendmentis
likely eve~tuallyto be ruled unconstit~tional,since the federal
constitution and the interpretation of the federal constitution by
the United States Suprene Court are the 'suprene law of the land",
"anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary
notwithstanding'I.

The history of the United States Constitution contains many instances in which a state statute or a provision of a state constitution has been ruled invalid because of a conflict witk the federal
constitution. In one such exaxple relating specifically to school
desegregation, an absclute statutory prohibition against pupilassign,
nie~tand busing to achieve racial balance was invalidated by the
United States Suprene Court because it conflicted with the federal

Prohibit Transportation of Students for Racial Balance
constitutional requirement for equal protection of the laws (North
Carolina State Board of Education 1. Swann). In this case, the court
ruled that:

...

to forbid...all assignments made on the basis of race
would deprive school authorities of the one tool absolutely essential to fulfillment of their constitutional
obligation to eliminate existing dual school systems...We
likewise conclude that an absolute prohibition against
transportation of students assigned on the basis of race
will similarly hamper the ability of local authorities to effectively remedy constitutional violations.

...

2. Pupil assignment and busing may not be the ideal means of
desegregatingaschool system, but they are the only practical methods of assuring that the desegregation of the system proceeds in the
short run. Desegregation could be more ideally achieved in the long
run through changes in housing patterns of minority citizens. This
sort of desegregation, however, is not likely to occur, at least in
the foreseeable future.

The choice seems to be between: (a) accepting pupil assignment and busing as inconvenient means toward achieving the desired
end of integration in public schools; or (b) accepting an unconstitvtionally segregated school system. Voluntary attempts to eliminate
segregation have been unsuccessful, and implementation of the proposed amendment would have the effect of leaving the minority children in the Denver school systerc without a remedy for racially discriminatory practices. Pupil assignment and busing for purposes of
integration are necessary not because they are to be desired in
themselves, but rather because they are more desirable than their
alternative.

3. One of the fundamental strengths of this country's form of
government is the process through which the judicial branch is responsible for determining when an elective body or an administrative
unit has abused one or more of the rights guaranteed to each citizen by the federal or a state constitution. The judicial branch has
the further responsibility of initiating a remedy for such a situation. The proposed amendment to the State Constitution is an attempt
to prevent the federal court from fulfilling its responsibility in
remedying the situation in which Denver citizens have been denied
"equal protection of the laws".
4.
In its absolute prohibitions against pupil assignment and
transportation for purposes of achieving racial balance, the proposed
amendment might restrict the ability of a school board or school administrator to plan and conduct even a limited program for interracial contact and educational experience. This would occur if the
rather ambiguous term "racial balance" were determined to include
limited programs such as walk-in integration (which requires no busing).
The amendment implies the perpetuation of racial isolation
even in areas of a school system which could be "naturally" integrated.
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5. The proposal should be rejected because it will have serious negative effects on the education of minority children in the
core city school system. In the Denver desegregation controversy,
the federal district court found that Denver's segregated schools
offered minority students unequal educational opportunities. This
finding was based on evidence of lower standards of expectations,
higher teacher turnover rates, lower levels of teacher experience,
lower student achievement, higher dropout rates, and other disadvantageous factors in the minority schools.
6. The busing of school children is not a real issue in the
overall Denver desegregation controversy. The Denver school system
was busing more than 11,000 students before the original suit was
initiated in the controversy in 1969. Since that time, the system
has had five years of limited experience with busing for integration. Increased transport.ation expenses are a small price to pay
for the elimination of racial discrimination in the Denver schools
and for the enhancement of educational opportunities for a large
number of the district's pupils.

AMENDMENT NO. 9
Ballot
Title:

--

INITIATED PROPOSAL

An act to amend Article V G@ the Constitution of the
State of Colo~adoconcnrning the reapportioning of legislative districts by 8 body xo be known as the Colorado Reapportionnent Commissiqn, which shall consist of
eleven electors, four of whon shall be appointed by the
legislative department, three by the executive department, and four by the judicial department of the state,
and adding new requirements to be considered in the
creation of legislative districts.

Provisions of the Proposed Constitutional Amendment
The proposed constitutional amendment would:
1.
Remove from the General Assembly the power tc reapportion
itself or to revise legislative district boundaries. After each
federal census (presently conducted every ten years), an elevenmember commissicn would assume responsibility for establishing district boundaries for the General Assembly. The commission would
consist of: (a) the Speaker and Minority Leader of the state House
of Representatives and the Majority and Minority Leaders of the
state Senate (or the designees of these legislative leaders); (b)
three appointees of the Governor: and (c) four appointees of the
Chief Justice of the Colorado Supreme Court.

2.

Allow no more than a five percent deviation between the

Reapportionment Comission
most populous and least populous districts in each house of the General Assenbly.

3. Require that ''...the aggregate linear distance of all district boundaries shall be as short as possible".
4. Encourage the preservation of communities of interest
(including ethnic, cultural, econo~ic,trade area, geographic, and
demographic factors) within a single district whenever possible, and
discourage the splitting of cities and t o m s between districts.

5. Require publication of a preliminary reapportionment plan
and public hearings on this plan in several areas of the state.
6. Provide for automatic review and ultimate approval of the
reapportion~entplan by the Colorado Supreme Court.
Comments
Present Reapportionment Requirements. The Colorado General
Assembly is required by the constitution to reapportion districts
uDon the availabilitv of information from each federal census. The
reapportionment must" be conducted in accordance with the following
criteria: (1) the state must be divided into single-member districts;
( 2 ) legislative districts in each house must have populations as
nearly equal as may be required by the Constitution of the United
States; ( 3 ) each district must be as compact in area as possible; and
(4) districts must contain whole counties except when it is necessary
to split counties to meet population requirements.

If the General Assembly fails to reapportion within 45 days of
the convening of a regular session following the availability of
census data, no legislator may succeed himself in office or receive
any conpensation or expenses until a reapportionment plan has been
adopted.
Members of the Proposed Commission. The proposal would establish a reapportionment conmission outside of the legislative branch
of state government. No more than six of the eleven members of the
commission could be affiliated with the same political party. The
membership of the commission would be determined at least partially
by geographic factors (each Congressional district of the state must
be represented on the commission, and at least one member of the conmission must reside west of the continental divide).
Appointments to the commission wou-ld be made in three phases;
acceptance of service by legislative leaders or designation of alternates for these leaders would occur prior to gubernatorial
appointments, and the appointments of the Governor would occur prior
to those of the Chief Justice. Thus, the appointment process would
be sufficiently flexible to enscre that the proposal's restrictions
on party affiliation and requirements for geographic representation
on the commission would be met.
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Compactness of Districts. The proposal is intended to clarify
the present constitutional requirement for compact districts by
providing that the "...aggregate linear distance of all district
boundaries shall be as short as possible". The intent of the sponsors is to avoid irregularities in district boundary lines which
may be placed in a reapportionment plan for reasons not related to
natilral boundaries, population requirements, and census and local
government boundaries.
Conflict with Amendment No. 6. This proposal would amend two
sections of'the constitution which are also subject to amendment by
Anendment No. 6. which was submitted to the voters bv the General
Assembly. The kections of the constitution which wo;ld be amended
in conflicting manners by the two proposals are Sections 46 and 48
of Article V.
In its amendment to Section 46 of Article V, this proposal
sets a maximum population deviation of five percent between the most
populous and the le2st populous legislative districts. Amendment
No. 6 sets a maximum deviation of five percent from the mean legislative district population, or an actual maximum deviation of 10
percent between the most populous and the least populous districts.
Section 48 of Article V vests power in the Colorado General
Assembly to revise an& alter legislative district boundaries following each federal census. This proposal would reenact this section,
vesting reapportionment powers with the Colorado Reapportionment
Commission. Amendment No. 6, on the other hand, would amend
Section 48 with the addition of certain technical language concerning federal census information needed for reapportionment. (Amendment No. 6 deals primarily with gubernatorial succession and is not
an alternate reapportionment plan.)
According to present Colorado law, if both amecdments are
approved by the voters,
the amendment which receives the greatest
number of affirmative votes will be adopted for those sections of
the constitution in which these conflicts occur (Sections 46 and 48
of Article V ) .
Thus, the proposal for the creation cf a Colorado
Reapportionment Commission could be jeopardized if Amendment No. 6
receives a greater number of affirmative votes than this proposal.
This matter, however, might eventually be brought to court, and a
judicial determination might effectively merge the two proposals,
since it may be determined that the content of this proposal is more
substantive in certain respects than the technical reapportionment
amendments contained in Amendnent No. 6.
In the preparation of the proposal, the sponsors made every
effort to ensure that the language of the amendment was technically
correct and consistent with existing provisions of the constitution.
The proposal was submitted to the legislative service agencies of
the General Assembly for this purpose. An accurately drafted proposal was then filed with the Secretary of State and provided to the
printer. Unfortunately, the subsequently printed copies which were
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actually circulated and signed contained three typographical errors.
The most important error involved the deletion of a period in section
47 (2) of the proposal, which tends to cloud the meaning of the section.
P o ~ u l a rArguments For
1. Colorado is experiencing one of the highest population
growth rates in the nation. Most of the growth is occurring in urban centers, while populations in cany other areas are stable or
declining. With regard to reappcrtionmect, this means that entitlement to legislative seats will increase for some communities, while
seats in other areas must be combined. The combinaticn of seats, of
course, often results in two or more incumbent legislators being
placed in the same legislative district. Thus, there is considerable personal involvement of legislators in 'he reapportionment process. Establishment of a reapportionment commission would free the
General Assenibly from the task of reapportioning itself and would
reduce the role that personal decisions play in the reapportionment
process.

2. The maximum population deviation of five percent between
districts is a reasonable standard which will allow greater flexibility in the location of small cities and towns within single l e ~ islative districts and which will make it easier to avoid splitting
counties between legislative districts. The use of a five percent
deviation would also permit more consideration of the ethnic, cultural, economic, and other aspects of reapportionment called for in
the proposal. (The standard of a one percent deviation was employe?
by the General Assembly in 1972 because no court had, at that time,
clearly defined the allowable deviation between legislative d i s t r i c ~
populations. It should be noted that the one percent deviation is
not likely tc be used by the General Assembly in the future, since
less stringent deviations have been declared acceptable in court
since 1972.)

.

Adoption of the proposal would mean that reapportionment
of legislative districts would occur only once every 10 years (unless the federal census is taken more often than every 10 years).
Present constitutional provisions do not place such a limit on the
General Assembiy. This limitation is necessary to prevent najor
redistricting efforts during the period between censuses (efforts
which are likely to occur with changes in party balance), since such
efforts divert legislators' attention from other critical matters.
The proposal would reduce the impact that partisan poli4.
tics can have on the drawing of legislative district boundaries,
through the placement of the commission outside the legislative
branch and through the requirements for appointment of commission
members by all three branches of state government. The proposal's
more stringent requirements for consideration of communities of
interest, for compact districts, and for minimization of the split
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ting of cities and towns, and the public visibility bf the activities of the reapportionment commission would tend to reduce the
gerrymandering of legislative districts.

5. The present reapportionment process contributes to endless
battles over redistricting and to enmity among state lawmakers.
This enmity carries over into other legislative business and is damaging to the effectiveness of the General Assembly in its role of
enacting laws in the best interests of Colorado citizens.
Popular Arguments Against
1. In November of 1966, Colorado voters approved a constitutional amendment to take Colorado judges out of politics. The effect
of the proposal is to put the Colorado Supreme Court back into politics. The Chief Justice would be required to appoint the final four
members of the reapportionment commission. Appointments of the Chief
Justice would determine the final geographic and political balance of
the commission. Such a duty could place the Chief Justice in an untenable position with regard to the court's review of any plan promulgated by the proposed reapportionment commission. If the Chief
Justice disqualifies himself from consideration of any plan, the remaining six justices of the Colorado Supreme Court may be deadlocked
in a three-three tie vote on a decision.

2. One of the stated objectives of the sponsors of the proposal is to develop a General Assembly in which members "represent
the state as a whole as well as their own districts". However, the
requirement of the proposal for the preservation of communities of
interest in the drawing of legislative district boundaries may magnify parochialism within the General Assembly rather than encourage
responsiveness to overall state needs.
Furthermore, the proposal does not establish clear priorities
among the various criteria to be used in the creation of legislative
districts.
Should the requirement for compact districts take precedence over the requirement for minimizing the splitting of cities
and towns? Should cultural and ethnic factors take precedence over
economic and trade area factors in the preservation of communities
of interest?

3 , The sponsors of the proposal are concerned that legislators devote too much time to reapportionment. However, according
to the time schedule set forth in the proposal, legislative leaders
on the commission could be involved in reapportionment at least from
July of the first year until March of the second year following the
federal census. Furthermore, the redrawing of United States Congressional districts will continue to be required of the state General
Assembly, which will have to devote time and effort to this type of
redistricting. Detailed census information and research staff manhours would thus be needed by both the commission and the General
Assembly, adding to the expense of reapportionment.
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4. Reapportionment commission plans in other states provide
mechanisms for reappointment or court action when the members of a
commission are unable to reach agree~enton a plan. Although this
proposal provides an odd number of coxmission members and a deadline
to be rret for the reapportionment plan, the proposal is silent as to
the course of action to be taken when the commission is unable to
develop a reapportionment plan within required time limits. On the
other hand, existing constitutional provisions penalize Colorado
legislators until they adopt a reapportionment plan.

5. There is no provision in the proposal restricting nonlegislative members of the reapportionment commission from running
for election to the General Assembly following implementation of
the redistricting plan.
Michigan included such a condition in its
reapportionment commission law in order to discourage commission
members from being influenced by their cwn political ambitions.
6. The language and conditions set forth in the proposal
depart from the established body of Colorado reapportionment case
law. If the proposal is adopted, the Colorado Supreme Court is
likely to be called upon to establish new guidelines as to its intent and meaning. The possibility of such litigation of the reapportionnent process would complicate the 1980 reapportionment.

AMENDMENT NO. 10 -- INITIATED PROPOSAL
--

Title:

-

act to amend the Constitution of the State of Colorado
to establish procedural steps to be complied with prior
to the detonaticn of nuclear explosive devices, requiring
prior approval of the detonation by the voters through
the enactment of an initiated or referred measure.

Provisions of the Proposed Constitutional Amendment
The proposed amendment to the State Constitution would:

1. Prohibit, in Colorado, the detonation (or the placement in
the ground for purposes of detonation) of any nuclear device, except
when approved by the voters at a general election.
2. Require the Governor to designate a state agency or official to certify.that sufficient and secure financial resources exist
to compensate for damages to persons or property occurring as a
result of any nuclear detonation.
Comments
Chemical explosives have been used for many years in mining,
excavation, and conventional oil and gas well stimulation.
The
"Plowshare" program of the United States Atomic E n ~ r g ? Cc~mission
involves the use, when conventional techniques are not adequate, of
nuclear explosives for similar purposes (including natural gas
stimulation, "in situ" retorting of cil shale, "in situ" leaching cf
copper, and hazardous waste disposal).
Nuclear devices release much
more energy per unit of volume than traditional chemical explosives,
allowing ease of transportation and placement for detonation.

Projects in Colorado to Date. Two joint projects involvingthe
Atcmic Energy Commission and private industry have taken place in
Colorado under the Plowshare urogram. Both uroiects were ex~erimental and designed to provide ihformaticn on the commercial feasibility of using nuclear explosives to release natural gas trapped in
geological formations of very low permeability (tight formations).
In such projects, nuclear devices are lowere? into deep wells, and
the explosions shatter the gas-bearing formations. A completely contained underground explosion results in a " c h i m e y " ~iitha large
volume of fractured rock. Additional fracturing also occurs beyond
the chimney. The fracturing increases the perneability of the formations, all-owing economical extraction of the natural gas.

Project Rulison, the first of these projects, was conducted on
Se tember 10, 1969. A 40-kiloton device was detonated at a depth of
8,c25 feet southwest of Rifle, Colorado. In Project Rio Blanco, t h
second project, three 30-kiloton n ~ c l e a rexplosives were placed vertically in a single well bore to fracture gas-bearing sands. The
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detonation phase of Project Hio Blanco occurred on May 17, 1973, in
the Piceance Basin of Rio Blanco County, about 50 ailes north of
Grand Junction. The nuclear devices in the project were placed at
depths of 5,840, 6,230, and 6,690 feet.
Factors Involved in Commercial Application.
Further experiments are needed before the techniques of nuclear detonation will be
readv for industrial aonlication. Resolution of the foliowing techiicai and non-technicaiA factors would have to occur prior to this
application.

1. Nuclear gas stimulation and other Plowshare projects must.
be technically feasible and economically competitive to ensure a return on capital investment.
2. If a nuclear device is csed to develop another energysourca
such as natural gas, there should be a substantial net gain in u s e able energy over that. which could be obtained if the fissionable materials were used for other purposes such as power reactors.

3. Protectian and adequate indemification of the public, its
property: and the environment against possible damage fro^ seismic
waves and accidental release of radioactive materials must beassured.

4. Technology should be sufficiently developed not only for
Plowshare projects, but also for other non-nuclear alternatives, in
order that the benefit:, risks, and social costs of nuclear and nonnuclear energy development alternatives may be directly compared.
5. The relative responsibilities and authorities of federal
and state government in relation to nuclear detonation prograns
should be clarified and fully established.
Present State Rolz. Congress has authorized the Atonic Energy
Commission to enter into agreements vith states concerning t,he regulation an& control. of c e ~ t a i naspects of atcnic energy, Specif'ica3ly, it is the intent of Congress to prrivlde stat.es witt- soae a ~ t h o r i'iytoregulate certain rsdioactive xaterials tc, cnsui-G pzblic health
and safety. Colorado is one of the states ii!voLvea jn such anagrsesent.
In the course of project i?io Blanco, the industrial sponsor :o
the project applied for axlci received peraits for the detonation of
nuclear devices from the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation C o w i s sion and the Colorado Water Pollution Control Commission. Thereafter, suit was brought in state district court alleging that the
perzits had been improperly issued on various grounds, an allegaticri
which the court found without rcerit.
One purpose of the suit was to test the state power to regulate Plowshare activities. The private indust-y contractor sponsoring Project Hio Blanco argued that the state aid not have jurisdiction to regulate Flowshare activities because of the doctrine of
federal supremacy and preemption. On b:ay 19, 1973, the court rcled
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that the state did have such power, exercised through the state
Water Pollution Control Commission? pursuant both to the Atomic I%ergy Commission's 1968 agreement wlth the State of Colorado and to
the contract between the private industry contractor and the Atomic
Energy Commission.
Some unresolved questions remain, however, particularly as to
the legal effect the proposed constitutional amendment would have on
Plowshare projects. The agreement provisions authorized by Congress
and the provisions of the actaal agreement between the State of
Colorado and the Atomic Energy Commission are limited in application,
while the proposal would vest blanket authority in Colorado voters
to determine whether any Plowshare projects could be conducted in
the state.
Ultimate enforcement of the proposal would probably be conditioned upon court determination as to whether this degree of state
regulation of Plowshare projects would be valid under the doctrine
of federal supremacy and preemption.
Po~ularArguments For

1. The people of Colorado have the right to make the ultimate
decision in a matter as important and controversial as a nuclear
detonation within the state.
Potentially, thousands of com~ercial
detonations are to take place in Colorado in the next few decades.
Although programs such as the Plowshare project detonations are
extremely technical, Colorado voters do not have to understand nuclear fusion or fission or other engineering processes in order to
make a reasonable and informed decision about a nuclear detonation.
The public simply needs to know the relative advantages and disad-.
vantages of a program such as nuclear gas stimulation, including
comparisons of: (a) alternative methods of extracting the resource;
(b) the need for the resource; (c) the availability of substitute
materials; (dl environmental risks involved; and (e) assurances that
adequate conpensation will be nade for damages caused by the detonation.
2. There are ample precedents for the State of Colorado to
take an active role with respect to the industrial use of nuclear
detonations. Adoption of the proposal will force the legislative
and executive branches of state government to more clearly delineate
procedures which must be followed and conditions which must be met
before a nuclear device may be exploded in Colorado. Similarly,
approval of the proposal will provide a clear expression to Congress
and the Atomic Energy Commission of the concern of Coloradoans that
further implementation of the Plowshare program in this state be
carried out with extreme caution and be based upon vital national
interests.

3. Alternatives to nuclear detonations should be further
developed.

In particular, two non-nuclear methods of natural gas
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extraction should be given priority study to determine their relative
effectiveness and environmental consequences. These are the use of
chemical explosives and the use of "hydraulic fracturing1'. The
latter involves the injection into the earth of liquids under high
pressure. The Atomic Energy Commission and several major industrial
concerns, including the industrial sponsor of Project Rio Blanco,
have signed a contract to conduct a massive hydraulic fracturing test
in the area of Project Rio Blanco to compare this method of natural
gas extraction with nuclear stimulation. Non-nuclear recovery of
natural gas, if feasible, has several advantages, including the avoidance of potential seismic and radiological hazards, and a more favorable net gain in useable energy.

4. The use of nuclear detonations raises concerns with regard to radiation contamination,.possibilities of seismic effects
even greater than those caused dlrectly by a nuclear detonation, and
problems of security arrangements for transportation of nuclear explosives, among others. The scientific community is far from agreement as to possible implications of nuclear detonation projects, and
in view of past technical mistakes, nuclear detonations must be approached with extreme caution.

5. Only a small percentage of the nation's future energy
will come from natural gas. Other energy sources which will have
greater ultimate impacts on the total United States energy situation
should be researched and developed now. The more glamorous Plowshare
program is diverting essential economic and human resources from the
research and development of these other energy sources.
6. Although the proposal is designed to halt nuclear blasts
which would be dangerous to the health and safety of Coloradoans, it
would still permit nuclear detonations to occur when the people
believe that they are essential and safe.
Po~ularArguments Against

1. The ultimate effect of the proposal would be to place a
moratoriun on Plowshare projects in Colorado, under the guise of
instituting an election procedure for nuclear detonations. The requirement for a vote on each nuclear application would severely hamper, and possibly eliminate, continued development of the technology.
Proponents of a com.ercia1 program of nuclear detonation would, prior
to conducting sn actual detonation, have to obtain over 50,000 signatures authorizing a vote on the detonation, or they would have to
have a bill passed through the Colorado General Assembly referringthe
measure to the people. The uncertainty and difficulty of either procedure would eliminate private investment required for any Plowshare
project and prevent development of needed gas supplies by this extraction method, regardless of its safety or effectiveness.
2. The proposed voting procedure would in itself cause an
unnecessary cost to the taxpayer. In addition, steps tc obtain a
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favorable vote are costly, and the cost of such steps would eventually have to be absorbed by the consumer.

3. All resource development proposals, including the Plowshare projects, involve the careful consideration and screening of
scientific data. Elected officials, both at the federal and state
levels of government, and the regulatory agencies which they create
(consisting of persons with a variety of highly technical skills),
are in the best position to carefully evaluate technical information
and to develop standards for nuclear detonatiops which will protect
the public health and safety. Review of any commercial Plowshare
program is required under the environmental impact statement process
of the 1970 National Environmental Policy Act.
The Colorado Departmefit of Health, the Colorado Oil and Gas
Conservation Commission, the Atomic Energy Commission, the United
States Bureau of Mines, the United States Geological Survey, and
other governmental agencies already issue permits for or review
nuclear detonations pursuant to specific standards or criteria.
4. Natural gas is the cleanest burning fossil fuel commonly
used. The nation is critically short of this fuel, and Colorado is 2
net importer of natural gas. The reserves of natural gas available
in the low permeability formations of the Green River and Piceance
Basins cannot be recovered through conventional means. These reserve:
by any measure, are very large. At a time of growing energy shortages, and when the United States is attempting to achieve energy independence, it is critical for the nation to investigate and develop
every available technology for the purpose of releasing gas from the:
reserves. The proposal, however, would actually preclude employment
of nuclear gas stimulation.

5. Plowshare projects are still in the experimental stage.
Additional testing is essential before there will be any reasonable
assurance that nuclear gas stimulation of a given field will be
economically competitive. Furthermore, additional information is
necessary before concl.usions may be made about other commercial activities under the Plowshare program. No curtailment of such programs
should even be considered until all experimental projects have been
completed and a careful analysis has been made of all relevant data.

6. The proposal subjects one resource recovery technique to
a direct referendum of the voters, while leaving others to regulatio~
by legislative or administrative bodies. The potential damage to tht
public interest from other energy resource development processes,
such as strip mining, may be far greater than that which would occur
under
commercial Plowshare projects, as evidenced by Projects Ruli.
son and Rio Blanco.

